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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 09-3097
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
MARKEIF FIELDS, a/k/a MARKIEF DON’TE PARKER, 
a/k/a KIEF,
                                                          Appellant.
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(4:CR-06-144)
District Judge:  Honorable Malcolm Muir
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a),
May 21, 2010
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
Opinion Filed: August 12, 2010
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge
Markeif Fields appeals the District Court’s 113-month prison sentence after
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pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy with intent to distribute and distributing 50
grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the facts only to the extent
necessary for resolution of the issue on appeal.  Fields and Devin Hockaday were
involved in a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine to co-conspirator Jimmy Dale
Doebler.  They sold one to one and one-half ounces of crack to Doebler between three
and four times per week between 2005 and 2006.  Occasionally, Fields and Hockaday
would receive firearms from Doebler as payment for the drugs.  Eventually, Fields and
Hockaday arranged for Kalief Fields to purchase the crack cocaine from suppliers in
Philadelphia and deliver it to Doebler in Northumberland County.  Doebler would then
resell the crack cocaine in the surrounding area.  A government informant purchased
drugs from Doebler, which tipped off the authorities to the scheme.  Police ultimately
arrested the four men and charged Fields with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and distributing 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846.  Fields entered a guilty plea on the charge.
At sentencing, the District Court determined the Guideline sentencing range to be
113 to 137 months.  Fields sought a downward variance pursuant to the crack/powder
cocaine differential.  The Court denied his request and sentenced him to113 months’
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imprisonment.  
II.
Fields raises one issue on appeal—whether the District Court imposed a
substantively unreasonable sentence when it declined to vary downward from the
Guidelines range based upon the crack/powder cocaine differential.  We review the
reasonableness of Fields’ sentence for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Wise,
515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Appellate review of a district court’s sentencing decision is ordinarily twofold. 
We begin “by ‘ensur[ing] that the district court committed no significant procedural error,
such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’” 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  “If the sentencing decision passes that first stage
of review, we then, at stage two, consider its substantive reasonableness.”  United States
v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).  “An estimation of the outer bounds of
what is ‘reasonable’ under a given set of circumstances may not always be beyond debate,
but the abuse-of-discretion standard by which that estimation must be judged limits the
debate and gives district courts broad latitude in sentencing.”  Id.
  Fields does not suggest that the District Court committed procedural error by1
erroneously concluding that it lacked discretion to vary from the crack cocaine
Guidelines.  
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Fields’ challenge to the District Court’s decision not to vary downwards based
upon the crack/powder cocaine differential is directed at the sentence’s substantive
reasonableness,  and we thus direct our attention solely to that question.  Fields is correct1
that the District Court had the discretion to so vary, see Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85, 110 (2007), but it was not required to do so.  In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court
held that “it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when
sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity is ‘greater than
necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes . . . .”  Id. at 110.  The Supreme Court went
further in Spears v. United States when it stated that “district courts are entitled to reject
and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement
with those Guidelines.”  --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843-844 (2009).  Thus, district
courts have the discretion to apply the existing crack/powder ratio or to implement their
own ratio, so long as they articulate a reasonable explanation for their decision.  “[T]he
district court must set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered
the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.”  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215-216 (3d Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Court concluded that a variance would create a sentencing disparity
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between Fields and his co-defendants, one of whom had already been sentenced within
the crack Guidelines range.  We have held that “[a]lthough § 3553(a) does not require
district courts to consider sentencing disparity among co-defendants, it also does not
prohibit them from doing so.”  United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006). 
In the District Court’s view, giving Fields the benefit of this variance, while imposing the
crack/powder ratio on another conspirators would create an undue sentencing disparity
between the co-defendants.  In an attempt to avoid unwarranted disparities between co-
defendants, the judge refused to grant this downward variance, which does not constitute
an abuse of discretion.  Id.  
Additionally, the Court concluded that the serious nature of Fields’ offense
precluded a downward variance.  The conspirators pled guilty to transporting and
distributing large amounts of crack cocaine in exchange for money and drugs.  In the
District Court’s view, giving Fields the benefit of the crack/powder variance would
understate the seriousness of the offense and would work to undermine the deterrent and
punitive purposes of the punishment.  These considerations provide further support for
the District Court’s decision not to vary downward based upon the crack/powder cocaine
differential.  That is, the Court weighed the competing factors under § 3553(a) and
determined that the imposition of the Guidelines’ crack/powder ratio resulted in an
appropriate sentence.  We see no abuse of discretion in this decision.  
III.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
